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ABSTRACT 
Disgust is an emotion that plays an important role in the maintenance and protection of physical 
and moral purity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999b).  Using a repeated taste-test 
paradigm, the present research extends recent work on moral cognition by investigating disgust 
reactions to rejected religious beliefs.  In Experiment 1, Christian participants rated a beverage as 
tasting more disgusting after writing a passage from the text of the Qur’an or Richard 
Dawkins’ The God Delusion than a control text.  In Experiment 2, Christian participants rated a 
drink as tasting more disgusting after writing a passage from the Qur’an than a control passage, 
but the effect was eliminated after participants physically washed their hands.  Participants 
writing a passage from the Bible showed the opposite effect of more disgust after washing their 
hands, indicating an aversive reaction to physical cleansing after contact with a source of moral 
purity.  These results provide evidence that contact with a rejected religious belief elicits disgust 
and that both negative and positive moral contagions can be removed through physical 
cleansing.  The implications of the results are discussed, including the possibility 
that holding true beliefs is an important component of one’s sense of moral purity, and that 
disgust helps protect these culturally valued truths.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The essence of religious feeling has nothing to do with reason, or 
atheism, or crime, or acts of any kind—it has nothing to do with 
these things—and never had.  There is something besides all this, 
something which the arguments of the atheists can never touch.  
But the principal thing, and the conclusion of my argument, is that 
this is most clearly seen in the heart... 
   -From The Idiot, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
 
Imagine stumbling to the refrigerator late at night, half asleep, looking for a refreshing 
drink of cold milk.  You reach for the carton and take a gulp, only to realize that the milk has 
been expired for weeks.  How would you respond?  Now, imagine that you are in a lab room of a 
nondescript psychology building.  Some researchers have put together a friendly economic game 
for you to play with another person.  $10 has been given to the other person to distribute between 
the two of you however they would like, but they only offer you $1 (and opt to keep the other $9 
for themselves).  How would you respond?   
As it turns out, these two events share something in common.  The former is offensive to 
our physical senses of taste and smell, whereas the latter is offensive to our moral senses, but 
both are literally disgusting (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009).  These actions 
constitute a violation of what has been called the ethic of purity or divinity (Rozin et al., 1999b; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997): acts that defile the mind/body, or violate the natural 
order of things.  One thus far under investigated domain in the study of moral purity, however, 
has been religious beliefs.  As the quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, religious 
beliefs are often associated with feelings more so than reasoning, indicating that emotions (like 
disgust) may play an important role in people’s subjective interpretation of information as well 
as actions.  In other words, we may be disgusted by bad food, bad actions and bad information.   
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In this paper I begin with a brief review of recent theory and research on morality (for an 
in-depth review, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), focusing primarily on the emotion of disgust and its 
relation to violations of the ethic of purity.  After presenting this theoretical foundation and 
reviewing past research, I present two experiments that investigate whether contact with rejected 
religious beliefs constitutes a violation of the ethic of purity and is thus literally disgusting.   
1.1 Moral Foundations 
The present research has been strongly influenced by two fairly recent developments in 
the scientific study of morality.  The first has been an increased acceptance of the principle of 
intuitive primacy (Haidt, 2001, 2007; see also, Damasio, 1994; Zajonc, 1980).  That is, we do not 
often decide what is right or wrong on the basis of conscious, rational reasoning, but rather it is 
our affect-laden intuitions that are the primary causes of moral judgment.  The second has been 
an increased recognition of a broader moral domain that expands beyond the traditionally 
individual-centered concerns for justice (Kohlberg, 1969) and care (Gilligan, 1982).  New 
theories of morality have aimed to capture both these individual-centered concerns, as well as the 
social-centered concerns often prescribed by one’s culture (e.g., Shweder et al., 1997).   
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) has provided an up-to-date synthesis of these two 
insights (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2009).  Drawing from centuries of moral 
theory and research, researchers have proposed that the human mind is equipped with (at least) 
five sets of foundations that form the intuitive basis of our moral judgments: 1) Harm/Care, 2) 
Fairness/Reciprocity, 3) Ingroup/Loyalty, 4) Authority/Respect, and 5) Purity/Sanctity.  These 
five foundations are said to constitute the innate ―first draft‖ of our moral mind—each having 
evolved to solve various problems faced by our ancestors—and allow for the automatic 
recognition of (and appropriate response to) important patterns in the social world.  The 
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harm/care foundation, for example, is proposed to be closely related to the theory of kin selection 
(Hamilton, 1964) and solved the challenge of caring for and protecting offspring/kin through the 
evolution of intuitions and emotions that made us sensitive to the suffering of others.  As another 
example, the fairness/reciprocity foundation—also closely related to the theory of reciprocal 
altruism (Trivers, 1971)—is proposed to have solved the problems inherent in extending 
cooperation beyond offspring and kin via automatic concerns for justice; cooperation could be 
reciprocated with unrelated others who acted fairly, while exploitation could be avoided by 
detecting, punishing, and monitoring patterns of selfishness in cooperative exchanges.   
Of primary importance to the current research is the purity/sanctity foundation.  This 
foundation is proposed to have evolved first to avoid physical threats like microbes and disease 
via automatic intuitions that made us sensitive to the contact history of people and food.  It has 
since expanded to apply in a socio-moral context as well, evident in our intuitive desires to live 
in a spiritually pure, clean, or sanctified manner (Haidt & Graham, 2009).  Thus despite being 
harmless in terms of both intentions and consequences, some behaviors may still be viewed as 
morally wrong if perceived as ―impure‖ (e.g., cleaning the bathroom with your nation’s flag, 
eating the family pet, or wearing the sweater of a convicted murderer; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993; Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994).  Important for the present research, disgust has 
been strongly implicated as the moral emotion of this foundation (Rozin et al., 1999b), serving to 
protect both the physical and spiritual body from harmful influences. Disgust has even been 
dubbed ―the body and soul emotion‖ for its role in providing the affective input for the intuitions 
that inform us of physical and moral impurities (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999a). 
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1.2 Literature Review 
Despite being a relatively new area of interest, an impressive body of experimental 
research has investigated the relation between disgust and moral purity.  Broadly speaking, this 
past work can be broken down into three areas: the measurement of disgust in response to moral 
violations, the manipulation of disgust and its effect on moral judgments, and the embodiment of 
physical purity as a metaphor for moral purity. 
1.2.1 Measuring Disgust 
In support of the evolutionary hypothesis that disgust is a body and soul emotion, many 
fMRI studies have discovered that socio-moral violations (e.g., reading descriptions of incest, or 
being treated unfairly) activate areas of the brain that are also associated with more primitive 
forms of disgust (Borg, Lieberman, & Kiel, 2008; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2003).  Even mere exposure to the photographs of members of extreme out-groups (e.g., the 
homeless) has been shown to activate the neural architecture associated with disgust (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006).  Moreover—and of special relevance to the present research—Harris, Sheth, and 
Cohen (2008) were among the first to investigate the processing of true vs. false beliefs at the 
level of the brain.  They simply asked participants to categorize a variety of statements as true, 
false, or unknown while being scanned in an fMRI (e.g., Children should have no rights until 
they can vote; A Personal God exists, just as the Bible describes; Wisconsin is on the West Coast 
of the United States).  In comparison to sentences categorized as true or unknown, these 
researchers found that participants reading false statements showed an increased BOLD response 
in the anterior insula and left frontal operculum; areas of the brain that have previously been 
linked to taste perception and disgust (Harris et al., 2008).   
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Further demonstrations of disgust in response to moral violations come from studies 
using behavioral and self-report measures.  Participants in one study, for example, were found to 
display the same disgust related oral-nasal rejection response after tasting sour liquid, viewing 
pictures of contaminants, or being treated unfairly in an economic game (Chapman et al., 2009).  
Participants have also been found to self-report affective reactions of disgust in response to out-
groups that threaten one’s moral ideals (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and disgust is reported as the 
emotion most likely to be elicited by purity violations such as eating human flesh or shaking 
hands with someone that has been in an incestuous relationship (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
2007; Rozin et al., 1999b). 
1.2.2 Manipulating Disgust 
 Several researchers have also established a causal relation between disgust and moral 
purity by manipulating disgust and measuring its effect on different types of moral judgments.  
In these studies participants are made to experience disgust by asking them to watch a disgusting 
video (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009), sit in a dirty work room filled with trash and 
pizza boxes (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008b), smell an unpleasant fart (Schnall et al., 
2008b), or upon reading a certain word as induced through post-hypnotic disgust (Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005).  These disgust manipulations led participants to make more harsh moral judgments 
(Schnall et al., 2008b; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), and increase their condemnation or approval of 
purity violations (e.g., sexual promiscuity) and virtues (e.g., eating healthy), respectively 
(Horberg et al., 2009).   
1.2.3 Embodiment of the Physical/Moral Purity Metaphor 
 A final line of research has demonstrated that the everyday relation between physical 
cleanliness and moral purity (e.g., having a ―clean conscience‖ or ―dirty hands‖) is not simply a 
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metaphor.  Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), for example, showed that participants experienced an 
increased desire to physically cleanse themselves after their moral purity had been threatened by 
asking them to recall or write about an unethical deed.  In other words, making participants feel 
morally unclean made them want to physically cleanse themselves.  
 In another study, Schnall, Benton, & Harvey (2008a) showed participants a video 
intended to elicit disgust (―the toilet scene‖ from the movie Trainspotting).  Immediately after 
watching the video, half of the participants were able to wash their hands before making some 
moral judgments, while the other half were not able to wash their hands.  Results showed that 
participants who washed their hands made less severe moral judgments than participants who did 
not, suggesting that physical cleansing made participants feel more pure and thus less sensitive to 
purity violations described in the moral vignettes. 
 Finally, Lee and Schwarz (2010) have demonstrated that the link between physical and 
moral purity is modality specific—that is, people tend to want to clean the part of their body that 
has transgressed.  In these studies, participants were asked to lie (or tell the truth) by either 
leaving a voice mail message or typing an e-mail.  Subsequently, participants’ desire for hand-
sanitizer and mouthwash was measured.  Participants who lied in a voice-mail message (i.e., 
transgressed with their mouth) showed an increased preference for mouthwash, whereas 
participants who lied by typing an e-mail (i.e., transgressed with their hands) showed an 
increased preference for hand sanitizer.   
Taken together, these three lines of research on moral purity (i.e., the measurement of 
disgust, the manipulation of disgust, and the embodiment of the physical/moral purity metaphor) 
suggest that disgust functions as an intuitive guide that motivates the avoidance of many 
different types of harmful influences, and plays an important role in our subjective experience of 
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right and wrong.  Further, this research also suggests that purity violations literally make people 
feel unclean, and that physical cleansing can lead to increased feelings of moral purity.  
1.3 The Present Studies 
The present research examines the role of disgust in the context of rejected religious 
beliefs.  If disgust can be elicited by purity violations such as those described above, we may 
also expect contact with morally impure beliefs to be perceived as a violation of the ethic of 
purity (e.g., ―unclean thoughts‖) and rejected by the same intuitive emotional mechanism.  There 
are several reasons to anticipate this finding.  First, the deities of large-scale religious societies 
are notoriously concerned with the cleanliness of their followers’ minds and bodies (Graham & 
Haidt, 2010, p. 144).  Religious rituals all throughout the world (e.g., baptism or ablution prior to 
prayer) are literal acts of bodily cleansing intended to symbolically purify the spirit and prepare 
the believer for communion with God.  Living in accord with a sanctified moral code thus 
contributes to one’s sense of moral purity, and any violation of this moral order may be 
perceived as a threat to that purity and elicit disgust.   
Second, one of the defining features that delineate one religion from another is the beliefs 
to which its group members adhere.  And while some religions may emphasize their beliefs as a 
defining feature of religious affiliation more than others (Cohen, Siegel, & Rozin, 2003), faith in 
a given culturally prescribed belief is a virtue rewarded with acceptance and inclusion.  
Moreover, these group-defining beliefs tend to have a strong moral component—that is, there are 
―right‖ and ―wrong‖ beliefs to hold, and there is a perceived moral consequence for believing 
(e.g., eternal reward) or disbelieving (e.g., eternal torture) the prescribed truth.    
Given this evidence that religion is associated with purity concerns, I reasoned that any 
contact with impure information may be perceived as a threat to one’s spiritual cleanliness and 
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rejected on that account.  Further, as reviewed above, because the emotion of disgust has been 
uniquely associated with purity violations, I expected contact with a rejected religious belief to 
elicit a disgust response.   
Two experiments addressed this hypothesis.  Using a repeated taste-test paradigm, 
disgust ratings of two identical beverages were measured before and after hand-copying a 
passage from a religious, atheist, or control text.  I predicted that participants would rate the 
second beverage to taste more disgusting than the first after exposure to a rejected religious 
passage (Experiment 1), and that physical cleansing would eliminate the effect by symbolically 
removing the moral impurity (Experiment 2). 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
2.1 Overview 
 Experiment 1 investigated disgust responses to rejected and neutral texts.  Specifically, I 
was interested in whether contact with a rejected belief system (i.e., Islam and Atheism among 
Christian participants) would be perceived as a threat to one’s moral purity.  To examine this 
hypothesis, participants in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to one condition of a single 
factor between subjects design (Qur’an/The God Delusion/Dictionary).  I predicted that writing a 
passage from the Qur’an and Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion would elicit disgust, whereas 
contact with the Dictionary would not because the information should not pose a threat to one’s 
moral purity. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants   
Participants in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were recruited through the Psychology 
Subject Pool at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  Using pre-screening measures 
administered to the Subject Pool, only participants who reported their religious affiliation as 
―Christian‖ could volunteer to participate.  This population was targeted for two reasons.  First, 
Christianity is the most widespread religion on campus, making Christian participants more 
readily accessible relative to the followers of other religions.  Second, religious identity should 
play an important role in whether one finds another belief system to violate the ethic of purity.  
Because Christianity, Islam and Atheism are all competing for the same explanatory space (e.g., 
the origin of the cosmos, the nature/existence of God, etc.), I reasoned that a participant who 
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explicitly defined themselves as a ―Christian‖ is likely to perceive these rejected beliefs as 
aversive and potentially threatening to their own moral purity.  
88 self-reported Christian undergraduates participated for partial course credit.  Six 
people were excluded for either failing to follow directions or guessing the hypothesis, leaving 
82 participants (29 men, 53 women; mean age = 19) included in the analysis. 
2.2.2 Repeated Taste-Test Paradigm 
 Participants were told that they would complete two separate studies: a consumer 
marketing survey, and an investigation into the relation between handwriting and personality.  
This cover-story allowed a measure of participants’ rating of a lemon-water solution on two 
separate occasions: once before and once after contact with a rejected or neutral passage. 
2.2.2.1 Lemon-Water Solution 
A solution consisting of 1 cup of lemon juice concentrate and 1 gallon of water was pre-
tested among a separate sample of 29 undergraduates.  Participants rated how disgusting the 
beverage tasted using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely).  The beverage was rated at 
the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.6, SD = 1.63). 
2.2.3 Procedures 
Participants were seated in a private laboratory room in front of a computer.  Instructions 
were given briefly by the experimenter, and then participants were left alone to follow 
instructions and give responses on the computer.  The experimenter gave participants a sheet of 
paper and a pen for the handwriting sample, and two cups of the lemon water solution (labeled 
―A‖ and ―B‖) they were told would be used for the consumer marketing portion of the study. 
Participants first tasted beverage ―A‖ and rated the drink on how disgusting it tasted on a 7-point 
scale (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely), along with some additional questions about the beverage 
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(e.g., sweetness; bitterness) and measures of their current positive/negative affect on a 5-point 
scale (1 = very slightly/not at all; 5 = extremely) (Thompson, 2007; see Appendix A). 
Next, participants were told that they would complete the handwriting portion of the 
study before tasting the second drink, ostensibly to allow time to cleanse their palate.  
Participants completed a six-item religiosity scale (Shariff, Cohen, & Norenzayan, 2008) to 
activate their religious identity (see Appendix B).  Next, one of three passages appeared on the 
screen.  Passages were taken from The Qur'an (Surah 47: 1-2), Richard Dawkins' (2006, p. 31) 
The God Delusion, and the preface of Merriam-Webster's dictionary, purposefully selected to be 
strong affirmations of the specific beliefs (see Appendix C).  Participants hand-copied the 
passage, then tasted and rated beverage ―B‖ using the same measures as before, and completed a 
44-item personality inventory (e.g., I am someone who is reserved) with items rated on 5-point 
scales (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly) (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) included to 
uphold the cover-story.   
2.3 Results 
 A disgust difference score was computed for each participant by subtracting the disgust 
rating of beverage A from beverage B, so that values greater than zero indicate that beverage B 
was rated more disgusting.  These disgust difference scores were submitted to a single factor 
ANOVA on condition (Qur'an/The God Delusion/Dictionary).  The predicted effect of condition 
was significant F(2, 79) = 4.8, p = .01 (see Figure 1).  Post-hoc comparisons using Bonferroni 
correction showed that the disgust difference scores were significantly higher in the Qur’an (M = 
.62, SD = 1.3, p = .02) and Dawkins (M = .48, SD = 1.4, p = .05) conditions relative to the 
Dictionary condition (M = -.34, SD = 1.1), but the Qur’an and Dawkins conditions did not differ 
from one another (p = 1). 
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Similar difference scores were computed for the other drink ratings, but there was no 
evidence of any significant differences in these ratings across conditions: Bitter F(2, 79) = .18, p 
= .80; Delicious F(2, 79) = 2.9, p = .06; Sour F(2, 79) = 1.4, p = .26; Sweet F(2, 79) = .27, p = 
.77. 
2.3.1 Religiosity Scale 
The religiosity scale showed strong reliability (α = .96; M = 3.5, SD = 1.0), and so the six 
items were averaged to create a composite measure of religiosity.  To examine any effect of 
religiosity, disgust difference scores were submitted to a single factor ANOVA on condition 
(Qur'an/The God Delusion/Dictionary) with the composite measure of religiosity as a covariate.  
The predicted effect of condition remained significant F(2, 78) = 4.8, p = .01.  There was no 
main effect of religiosity or a religiosity x condition interaction.   
2.3.2 Affect 
Composite positive and negative affect scores were computed by averaging ratings made 
after tasting beverage A (PA α = .72, M = 2.8, SD = .73; NA α = .72, M = 1.4, SD = .46) and 
after tasting beverage B (PA α = .75, M = 2.7, SD = .77; NA α = .81, M = 1.4, SD = .55).  
Including difference scores of these composite positive/negative affect values as covariates in the 
original analysis revealed that more negative affect after drink B than drink A was associated 
with rating drink B more disgusting than drink A (β = 1.1), t(77) = 2.6, p = .01.  However, the 
effect of condition remained significant (F(2, 77) = 5.2, p = .007), indicating that negative affect 
alone cannot account for the present findings (no other main effects or interactions were found). 
2.4 Discussion  
These results support the hypothesis that contact with a rejected belief system elicits 
disgust.  Christian participants rated a drink to taste more disgusting after writing a passage from 
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the Qur’an or Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, but not a neutral text.  The present findings 
thus extend past work on moral purity by demonstrating that people can be disgusted by not only 
impure objects and actions, but also impure information.  There are several limitations to the 
current study, however, including the lack of an ingroup religious text control condition.  
Further, the effect deserves replication before drawing any firm conclusions.  The second 
experiment thus aimed to replicate and extend the present findings by including a cleanliness 
manipulation as well as a Bible condition to investigate the hypothesis that participants will not 
show the same disgust response after contact with an ingroup religious passage.    
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2.5 Figures 
Figure 1.  Mean differences in disgust ratings of beverages by condition.  Higher values on 
this scale indicate that the second drink (after writing the passage) was rated more 
disgusting than the first drink (before writing the passage).  Error bars represent +/- 1 
standard error. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
3.1 Overview 
Experiment 2 examined whether the disgust reaction observed in Experiment 1 might be 
extinguished or reversed if participants are given an opportunity to purify themselves following 
contact with the rejected belief.  Further, an ingroup religious passage condition was included to 
verify that participants are not disgusted by a passage from their own faith (i.e., that their own 
religious text is not perceived as a source of moral impurity).  As discussed in section 1.2.3, 
recent research has suggested that everyday language associating physical cleanliness with moral 
purity is more than just a metaphor—that is, feelings of moral uncleanliness are accompanied by 
feelings of physical uncleanliness.  If participants literally feel dirty after contact with a rejected 
religious text, physical cleansing may reduce those feelings of moral impurity (i.e., disgust).  
Using a hand-washing manipulation (see Lee & Schwarz, 2010b), participants in Experiment 2 
either washed their hands or not following exposure to an accepted/rejected religious text 
(Qur’an/Bible/Dictionary).  For participants writing a passage from the Qur’an, I predicted that 
post-contact disgust would remain in the absence of hand-washing (thus replicating the results of 
Experiment 1).  However, I predicted that post-contact disgust would be attenuated for 
participants who cleaned their hands with an antiseptic wipe after contact.  Conversely, I 
predicted that contact with the accepted religious text (i.e., the Bible) would not elicit disgust 
because it is not a source of moral impurity for Christians.  No firm a priori predictions were 
made concerning the effect of hand-washing after contact with the Bible. 
 
16 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
 147 self-reported Christian undergraduates participated for partial course credit.  Six 
people were excluded for either failing to follow directions or guessing the hypothesis, leaving 
141 participants (50 men, 91 women; mean age = 19.5) included in the analysis.   
3.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions of a 3 (Passage) x 2 
(Antiseptic Wipe) between subjects design.  The procedure and materials were the same as in 
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions.  First, participants were asked to estimate the retail 
price of an individually wrapped antiseptic hand-wipe following the handwriting task, ostensibly 
as part of the consumer marketing phase of the experiment.  Critically, half of the participants 
were asked to open and use it to wash their hands, and half were instructed only to look at the 
wipe without using it.  Second, a condition using a Bible passage (Romans 5: 8-10) was 
included, selected as the ingroup religious passage (see Appendix C).  Finally, a 7-point version 
of the religiosity scale used in Experiment 1 was included at the end of the experiment to avoid 
priming participants before manipulation. 
3.3 Results 
Disgust difference scores were computed as in Experiment 1.  These disgust difference scores 
were submitted to a 3 (Passage: Qur’an/Bible/Dictionary) x 2 (Antiseptic Wipe: Look/Use) 
ANOVA.  The predicted Passage x Wipe interaction was significant F(2, 135) = 4.1, p = .02, 
with no main effect of Passage or Wipe.  An investigation of the means in each condition 
revealed that participants writing a passage from the Qur’an who did not wash their hands had a 
higher disgust difference score (M = .38, SD = 1.3) relative to participants who did wash their 
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hands (M = -.21, SD = 1.5; F(1, 135) = 2.1, p = .15).  Conversely, participants writing a passage 
from the Bible who did not wash their hands had a lower disgust difference score (M = -.26, SD 
= 1.6) relative to participants who did wash their hands (M = .71, SD = 1.6; F(1, 135) = 5.8, p = 
.02).  Participants in the dictionary condition showed a much weaker effect between those who 
did (M = .04, SD = .97) and did not (M = .26, SD = 1.2) wash their hands, F(1, 135) = .3, p = .60. 
 Similar difference scores were computed for the other drink ratings, but there was no 
evidence of any significant Passage x Wipe interactions (Bitter F(2, 135) = .03, p = .97; 
Delicious F(2, 135) = 2.5, p = .09; Sour F(2, 135) = 1.7, p = .19; Sweet F(2, 135) = 1.2, p = .31.) 
or main effects among these measures. 
3.3.1 Religiosity Scale 
The religiosity scale again showed strong reliability (α = .93; M = 5.2, SD = 1.5), so a 
composite measure of religiosity was computed as in Experiment 1.  To examine any effect of 
religiosity, disgust difference scores were submitted to a 3 (Passage: Qur’an/Bible/Dictionary) x 
2 (Antiseptic Wipe: Look/Use) ANOVA with the composite measure of religiosity as a 
covariate.  This analysis revealed the predicted Passage x Wipe interaction, F(2, 131) = 7.7, p = 
.001, as well as a significant main effect of Passage, F(2, 131) = 6.8, p = .002, and a Passage x 
Religiosity interaction, F(2, 131) = 6.6, p = .002.  The main effect of Passage reflected the fact 
that participants in the Bible condition had a higher estimated marginal mean disgust difference 
score (M = .31) than participants in the Qur’an (M = .19) or Dictionary (M = .20) conditions. 
 To further investigate the Passage x Religiosity interaction, a religiosity factor was 
created by coding participants who fell below the midpoint of the religiosity scale as ―low‖ (n = 
25), and those above the midpoint of the scale as ―high‖ (n = 116).  Simple effects tests of 
religiosity (high vs. low) within each passage condition revealed that low religiosity participants 
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had a significantly higher disgust difference score (M = 2.4) than high religiosity participants (M 
= -.10) in the Bible condition (F(1, 131) = 17.4, p < .001).  Low religiosity participants also had 
a significantly lower disgust difference score (M = -.99) than high religiosity participants (M = 
.28) in the Qur’an condition (F(1, 131) = 5.8, p = .02). 
 These findings prompted two subsequent 3 (Passage: Qur’an/Bible/Dictionary) x 2 
(Antiseptic Wipe: Look/Use) ANOVA’s: one among high religiosity participants, and one 
among low religiosity participants.  Among high religiosity participants, the Passage x Wipe 
interaction remained highly significant, F(2, 110) = 7.2, p = .001 (see Figure 2), with no main 
effect of Passage or Wipe.  Examining the simple effect of Antiseptic Wipe (look vs. use) within 
each level of the Passage factor revealed a marginally significant difference in the Qur’an 
condition (MLook = .65, MUse = -.1, F(1, 110) = 3.3, p = .07), a significant difference in the Bible 
condition (MLook = -.76, MUse = .57, F(1, 110) = 10.2, p = .002), and no significant difference in 
the Dictionary condition (F(1, 110) = 1, p = .30).   
Among low religiosity participants, there was a main effect of Passage (F(2, 19) = 9.5, p 
= .001), with no main effect of Wipe or a Passage x Wipe interaction. 
3.3.2 Affect 
Composite positive and negative affect scores were again computed by averaging ratings 
made after tasting beverage A (PA α = .79, M = 2.6, SD = .84; NA α = .60, M = 1.4, SD = .44) 
and after tasting beverage B (PA α = .82, M = 2.5, SD = .87; NA α = .72, M = 1.3, SD = .47).  
Including difference scores of these composite positive/negative affect values as covariates in the 
first analysis revealed no main effects or interactions with affect, suggesting that positive or 
negative affect does not account for the present findings.  
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3.4 Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the effect of Study 1—the second drink was rated to be more 
disgusting after contact with a rejected religious text, particularly for highly religious participants 
(i.e., those who value their religion as an important part of their identity).  Study 2 also extended 
the results of Study 1 by demonstrating that the disgust response could be removed with hand 
washing.  This finding is consistent with previous research on the link between physical 
cleanliness and moral purity, suggesting that hand-washing reduced feelings of moral impurity 
(i.e., disgust) after contact with the rejected religious passage.   
Further, the inverse effect was found among participants writing a passage from the 
Bible: Christians writing a passage from the Bible rated the second drink as less disgusting if 
they did not wash hands, but more disgusting if they did wash their hands.  Recall that hand 
washing in Schnall et al.’s (2008) study caused participants to become less sensitive to violations 
of moral purity after watching a disgusting video (i.e., a feeling of moral impurity had been 
removed through physical cleansing). In the present research, hand washing after writing a 
passage from the Bible appears to have caused participants to become more sensitive to purity 
violations (i.e., a feeling of moral purity was removed through physical cleansing).  These results 
thus provide initial evidence that physical cleansing can symbolically remove both negative and 
positive contagion.  The implications of these findings are discussed in more detail below.                  
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3.5 Figures 
Figure 2.  Mean differences in disgust ratings of beverages in each Passage x Wipe 
condition among highly religious participants (n = 116).  Higher values on this scale 
indicate that the second drink (after writing the passage) was rated more disgusting than 
the first drink (before writing the passage).  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Two studies provide evidence that contact with rejected belief systems produces a disgust 
response.  In Experiment 1, Christian participants rated a drink to taste more disgusting after 
writing a passage from the Qur’an or Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, but not a control text.  
Of key importance, the effect was removed (and even reversed) in Experiment 2 when 
participants were instructed to clean their hands after copying the passage.  This suggests that 
contact with rejected religious beliefs constitutes a violation of the ethic of purity, and that 
physical cleansing restored a sense of moral purity following contact.  Moreover, these results 
are consistent with past theory and research suggesting that disgust has evolved to protect both 
the physical and spiritual body from impurity.  That is, concerns for purity provide an important 
foundation for our judgments of right and wrong, and feelings of moral impurity (i.e., disgust) 
are embodied, leaving people feeling physically unclean after contact with impure beliefs.   
Strikingly, the inverse effect was found for Christians writing a passage from the Bible; 
the second drink was rated less disgusting for those who did not wash their hands, and more 
disgusting for those who did.  Whereas most research on the embodiment of the physical/moral 
purity metaphor has focused on cleaning off negative contagion (e.g., Lee & Schwarz, 2010a; 
Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), the present results provide initial evidence that both negative and 
positive contagions can be removed through physical cleansing.  Thus, while these data are 
consistent with the law of contagion which suggests that people are hesitant to come into contact 
with any object that has been tainted by a negative essence (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), 
participants writing a passage from the Bible may have been equally averse to removing its 
positive essence by washing their hands.  That is—feelings of moral purity removed through 
physical cleansing may lead people to become more sensitive to purity violations, and feelings of 
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moral impurity removed through physical cleansing may lead people to become less sensitive to 
purity violations.  To the best of my knowledge this is the first finding of its kind and has clear 
parallels in other domains, such as the athlete who refuses to wash her lucky pair of socks, or the 
rabid fan who goes weeks without washing their cheek after its been kissed by a celebrity.  
People often find it aversive to remove a positive essence and may even find themselves 
increasingly susceptible to negative outcomes once a positive essence has been removed (e.g., ―I 
won’t play well without my lucky socks!‖).  At this point, however, these insights are largely 
speculative, and further research is necessary to more fully understand the psychological 
processes underlying this phenomenon.    
These results also have clear implications for intergroup relations. Can we ever have 
peace between groups that are fundamentally disgusted by each other?  Theory and research has 
shown that our moral judgments are powerfully guided by automatic intuitions—that we 
perceive something as wrong because it feels wrong, not because we have reasoned that it is 
wrong (Haidt, 2001).  This suggests that perhaps the problem is intractable.  Efforts to achieve 
inter-religious understanding and cooperation are actually working against the evolved 
psychological mechanisms that function to protect and maintain personal purity and ingroup 
solidarity.  However, these automatic intuitions are also possible to overcome or even change 
given the appropriate circumstances (Haidt, 2001), suggesting that—however improbable—
peaceful inter-religious relations are at least theoretically possible.  
Finally, this research contributes to the nascent line of research on the morality of beliefs.  
Recall that Harris et al. (2008) recently found that areas of the brain associated with disgust and 
taste perception are activated while reading sentences perceived as false.  It is not yet clear, 
however, whether people are disgusted by falsity in general, or moral falsity specifically.  In 
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other words, would people be disgusted by writing about non-moral falsities (e.g., the moon is 
made of cheese)?  Although I am currently investigating this question, it is possible that people 
are only disgusted by information that violates personally and culturally valued moralized 
beliefs—that is, beliefs for which there is a perceived moral consequence for believing or 
disbelieving.  Holding true beliefs may thus be an important component of one’s sense of moral 
purity, and an area worthy of future investigation (c.f. Anderson, 2008). 
Together, the present research represents an important contribution to the study of 
morality.  Whereas the majority of past work on moral purity has focused on disgust in response 
to morally questionable objects and actions, these data suggest that morally questionable beliefs 
may be an equally threatening source of impurity.  And while I have focused here on reactions to 
religious beliefs among Christian participants, there are potentially far reaching implications for 
other populations and other types of moralized beliefs as well (e.g., liberalism vs. conservatism).  
Investigating the intuitive disgust responses people have toward the mere ideas and beliefs of 
other groups may help shed light on these types of culture wars.  For now we can conclude that 
perceiving other Gods as gross and atheism as icky is the natural consequence of an evolved 
psychological mechanism—namely, the emotion of disgust—that functions to protect one’s 
physical and spiritual purity.  Future research in this area has the potential to lead to important 
insights in the study of religion and religious cognition, topics that clearly make up an important 
part of the lives of so many people throughout the world.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Positive/Negative Affect Schedule used in Experiments 1 and 2 (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 
2007).  Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely).   
 
1) In this moment I am feeling upset. 
2) In this moment I am feeling hostile. 
3) In this moment I am feeling alert. 
4) In this moment I am feeling ashamed. 
5) In this moment I am feeling inspired. 
6) In this moment I am feeling nervous. 
7) In this moment I am feeling determined. 
8) In this moment I am feeling attentive. 
9) In this moment I am feeling afraid. 
10) In this moment I am feeling active. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Religiosity scale used in Experiments 1 and 2 (Shariff, Cohen, & Norenzayan, 2008).  Items 
were rated on a 5-point scale in Experiment 1 (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) and a 
7-point scale in Experiment 2 (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
 
1) My personal religious beliefs are very important to me.  
2) My religion or faith is an important part of my identity.  
3) If someone wanted to understand who I am as a person, my religion or faith would be 
very important in that.  
4) I believe strongly in the teachings of my religion or faith.  
5) I believe in God. 
6) I consider myself a religious person. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Passages selected from The Qur’an, Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, The Bible, and 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary to serve as stimuli in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
As for those who are bent on denying the truth and on barring 
others from the path of God – all their good deeds will He let go to 
waste; whereas those who have attained to faith and do righteous 
deeds, and have come to believe in what has been bestowed on 
high on Muhammad – for it is the truth from their Sustainer – shall 
attain God’s grace: He will efface their past bad deeds, and will 
set their hearts at rest (The Qur’an, Surah 47: 1-2). 
 
The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant 
character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, 
unforgiving control freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic 
cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, 
genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomanical, sadomasochistic, 
capriciously malevolent bully (Dawkins, 2006, p. 31). 
 
But God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet 
sinners, Christ died for us.  Much more then, being now justified 
by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.  For if, 
when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of 
his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life 
(Romans 5: 8-10). 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary has been created by a company 
that has been publishing dictionaries for 150 years. It has been 
edited by an experienced staff of lexicographers, who believe it 
will serve well those who want a concise and handy guide to the 
English language of today (Preface to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 1997).     
 
 
 
